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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM ANDREWS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden 
of the Utah State Prison, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 18230 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petitioner William Andrews hereby moves the Court for 
rehearing and reconsideration of its decision, issued November 16, 
1983, denying his Petition for habeas corpus and reaffirming his 
sentence of death. With all respect, Petitioner submits this Court 
has misapprehended the facts of this case, misapplied the law, and 
denied him the equal protection of the law of this State. 
Petitioner will not reiterate all the arguments he has made 
here before in this rehearing petition. He maintains them, 
however, and adopts them by reference. The argument in this 
petition will limit itself to those specific areas in which 
Petitioner believes the Court has misappreneded the facts or 
misapplied the law to his case. 
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1. The Facts 
The statement of facts in the appendix to the court's 
opinion reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence of 
the culpability ,of Petitioner William Andrews. There was no 
evidence anyone was "forced by [Andrews] ••. to drink a caustic 
chemical substance capable of causing their death." Ibid. Orren 
Walker testified that ~ierre did that. Tr. 3075-76, 3085-87, 3183. 
No witnesses testified that "the substance would have caused the 
death of the ••• victims ••• but for the promptness of the medical 
attention given to them." There was certainly evidence that 
Andrews made an "effort to halt the course of events". See Tr. 
3072, 3073-74, 3091, 3183. And it ~s simply not true that "Andrews 
was present and either assisted or observed Pierre during all the 
events described" in the court's appendix. See Tr. 3093, 3100-10, 
3188. 
There is a very real question as to whether the death 
penalty could constitutionally be imposed on William Andrews, under 
any standard. See Enmund v. Florida, 50 U.S.L.W. 5087 (July 2, 
1982); Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 
1982); Jones v. Thigpen, 555 F.Supp. 870 (S.D. Miss. 1983); People 
v. Tiller, 447 N.E.2d 174 {Ill. 1983), cert. denied U.S. 
(1983); State v. McDaniel, 665 P.2d 70 (Ariz. 1983). Certainly, in 
light of these facts, the error in the sentencing standard applied 
in his case cannot be harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
2 
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2. The Question of Retroactivity 
This Court's attempt to apply federal retroactivity analysis 
to this case consistently overlooks one critical fact: this case is 
sui generis. Though there may be a difference in the purpose 
served by the wood standard and the purpose of the reasonable doubt 
standard at the guilt phase of a criminal trial, the major 
constitutional difference is that the need for c~rtitude and 
consistency is greater where life and death are at stake. See 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625 (1980); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1977). 
If the purpose of the wood standard was to promote 
"fairness", Petitioner had as much right to a fair trial as Walter 
Wood, Joseph Paul Franklin (to whose trial court this Court rushed 
its wood decision before it was final, see Yocum Affidavit, 
Petition Exhibit D), and all the cases that have enjoyed it since. 
If the purpose of the Wood standard was to promote "consistency" 
(slip op. 19), the result of this decision is to destroy that, by 
consistently applying the same standard in all cases except these 
petitioners. 
Wood may have been a "'clear break with the past'" (slip op. 
21), but the only past there was is this case: in no other capital 
case affirmed by this Court has the jury been instructed in the 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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manner it was here.l In the only other case with this instruction 
error, where the defendant's crime was certainly no less serious 
than this one, the death penalty was reversed. See State v. Brown, 
607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980). 
The Court never deals with the second aspect of the Johnson 
test, "the extent of reliance on the old rule •••• " Slip op. at 
17. That is understandable, because there was none. No other case 
would have to be reversed by a holding that this rule was 
retroactive, as this Court well knows. Because of that, the 
statement that it "would not serve the administration of justice" 
to so hold (slip op. 21) translates into a statement that "the 
administration of justice" requires these petitioners to die--while 
Gerald Brown, Walter Wood, Joseph Franklin, John Calhoun, and 
others guilty of similar crimes are let live. That is not the 
meaning of-Johnson's objective tests. It is a euphemism for a 
deliberate denial of the equal protection of the law. 
1 The Court's statement that "a higher standard may have in fact 
been employed in some non-jury cases" prior to Wood (slip op. 21 
n.5) overlooks the fact that the wood standard was given to the 
juries in State v. John Michael Calhoun and State v. Joseph Paul 
Franklin. see Petition Ex. B. The C~urt is also incorrect "that 
prior to Brown, the Pierre standard was consi~tently used in 
capital prosecutions, see, e.g., State v~ Cod1anna, Utah, 573 P.2d 
343 (1977) •••• " Slip op. at 21. The Pierre standard was not 
applied by the trial court in Codianna. And if "e.g." means "for 
example", there are no other examples that either Respondent or the 
Court have pointed to. 
4 
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3. The Equal Protection Question. 
Petitioner made it clear in his petition here that he 
limited the issues to those which arose out of the Wood decision, 
and did not attempt to relitigate those issues this Court had 
previously rejected in this case. See Petitioner's Reply Memo at 
10. Petitioner has therefore not again proffered the evidence this 
Court refused to hear in Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 825 (Utah 
1980), regarding the arbitrary and racially discriminatory manner 
in which the death penalty had been imposed throughout the State of 
Utah, and the particular evidence of discrimination against 
Petitioner in this case. That evidence has been gathered for a 
hearing in federal court--and Petitioner remains willing to present 
it in state court; but this Court has refused to hear it. 
Petitioner has made a new and distinct claim here: that 
singling him and his codefendant out for treatment different from 
that given every other Utah capital defendant would deny him the 
equal of the law. See Petition at 3. Though ail the cases in 
which that standard had been applied up to the time of wood 
involved white defendants, and th~ inconsistent positions of the 
Attorney General of Utah in Petitioner's case and these others, 
give this claim a racial aspect, it does not rest on race alone. It 
rests on the simple obligation of the State to apply its law 
evenhandedly, in all cases before it, the most basic and literal 
kind of equal protection of the law. That is what Petitioner has 
been denied here. 
5 
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Petitioner did not provide affidavits "regarding the facts 
and circumstances" of the cases in which the wood standard was 
earlier applied, because he had no idea this Court would find those 
relevant, and Respondent never claimed they were. Surely, the 
Court was familiar with the facts of the cases of Walter wood and 
Gerald Brown. And Petitioner provided descriptions of the case of 
Joseph Paul Franklin (Petitioner's Brief at 4) and of John Michael 
Calhoun (Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9 n.9). One of the Justices 
of this· Court, the author of this opinion, sentenced Robert 
Phillips (see Petition Ex. D); Petitioner understands that case 
involved a robbery murder of a taxicab driver. Finally, Petitioner 
specifically asked the Court to remand this case for evidence on 
t~is point, if it somehow found this information relevant or the 
affidavits insufficient. See Petitioner's Brief at 13 n.5. 
Petitioner cannot understand how anyone can prove that a different 
result might have obtained in those cases (and others decided 
since) under a different sentencing standard--at least not without 
a hearing at which the sentencers themselves could be called. If 
the Court maintains that question is relevant, Petitioner renews 
his request for such a hearing here. 
Petitioner maintains this issue can and should be decided as 
a matter of law, however, simply on the basis of the difference in 
the instructions here. As Petitioner has previously noted, the 
court's assumption that the Utah statute, prior to Wood, was 
constitutional is simply not warranted. Zant v. Stephens, 51 
6 
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U.S.L.W. 4891 (June 22, 1983) added additional authority to his 
argument that statutes of this type--which require no jury 
findings, do not substantially narrow the scope of capital crimes, 
and provide for no specific appellate sentencing review--are 
unconstitutional. See 51 U.W.L.W. at 4894-95. This Court's 
decision in Wood may cure that constitutional defect; but denying 
this Petitioner the benefit of that protection can only compound 
it. 
4. The Question of Harmless Error. 
The Court's alternative finding of harmless error in this 
case is remarkable, in light of its recognition that "[n]o measure 
of 'accuracy' exists whereby that decision [to impose the death 
penalty] can be analyzed in the same way as the decision about 
whether a fact is true or false." Slip op. at 20. Certainly, the 
harmless error standard the Court has fashioned for this case is 
fnconsistent with that fact, and the law elsewhere. 
The Court's citation of the harmless error rule upheld in 
Barclay v. Florida, 51 U.S.L.W. 5206 (July 6, 1983) overlooks a 
fundamental fact about that Florida rule: it applied only where 
there is a specific finding that "there were no statutory 
mitigating circumstances •••• n 51 u.s.L.W. 5213 n.12. Here there 
was no such finding, and substantial evidence of several statutory 
and non-statutory mitigating factors. See Petitioner's Reply Brief 
at 9 n.9 & 10. The Court's citation of Zant v. Stephens, is 
similarly misleading. The Georgia Supreme Court's review "to avoid 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
arbitrariness and to assure proportionality" differs substantially 
from anything this Court is required to do by statute, or has ever 
done. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976). The Court 
has never purported to compare Petitioner's sentence with those 
imposed in other cases, has never afforded him an opportunity to 
submit the facts of other cases for comparison, and has no power to 
reduce the sentence on the basis of a finding of disproportionality. 
No principle of law, or fair accessment of the facts supports the 
statement that "no rational judge or jury could ••• have 
determined" William Andrews did not deserve death. The Court held 
that in Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812, 815 (Utah 1980), not in 
this Petitioner's case. 
William Andrews did not kill anyone. William Andrews was 19 
years old at the time of his alleged involvement in this crime. 
William Andrews had never before been convicted of a crime of 
violence. William Andrews came from a deprived background and a 
broken home. There was substantial evidence that he made some 
attempt, however ineffectual, to stop these murders. Surely--if a 
rational juror could choose to spare the life of Joseph Paul 
Franklin for the race-motivated cold blooded murder of two people, 
or John Michael Calhoun for a similar crime in the course of a 
burglary, or Gerald Brown for his vicious double homicide--a 
rational juror could decide to spare the life of William Andrews, 
who killed no one. 
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Petitioner once again implores this Court to look 
individually at his case and decide it under the same standards it 
has used in others. If it does, he submits that fairness and equal 
protection require that his death sentence be reversed. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
9 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Earl F. Dorius 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
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